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Chapter 6   
Valorization 
 
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the financial intermediaries from both 
the macro and micro perspectives, including the role of deposit insurance in providing “Safe 
Haven” or “Regulatory Arbitrage”, the fundamental factors that drive the physical location 
of bank branches, as well as the banking lending channel for corruption to affect economic 
growth. 
Chapter 2 contributes to the understanding of the role of deposit insurance schemes, as 
well as the determinants of cross-border banking. This study analyses retail deposits, which 
are actually covered by deposit insurance and enable us to identify the direct insurance 
effects. Furthermore, we investigate not only the attractiveness of the bank countries’ 
deposit insurance, but also the differences of deposit insurance between the depositor 
country and the bank country. Lastly, we investigate not only the effect of explicit deposit 
insurance but also consider its specific features, as the effectiveness of deposit insurance 
depends crucially on its design and implementation. 
The findings add therefore to the debate on the design of macro-prudential instruments in 
globalized financial markets. This discussion, currently focused on cross-border banking, 
questions their effectiveness when parties are able to circumvent these measures via 
regulatory arbitrage and calls for coordination among national regulators. As our analyses 
cover regulatory differences across countries we can provide in-depth insights into which 
features can induce regulatory arbitrage. Likewise, the findings, documenting a novel 
pattern of save haven and regulatory arbitrage driven behaviour by depositors, also stress 
the need for a coordinated regulatory strategy with respect to deposit insurance schemes. 
For example, the analysis shows the potentially changing importance of safe havens and 
regulatory arbitrage during stable versus crisis times, as well as the impact and efficiency of 
emergency actions taken by many countries in response to the severity of the 2008/09 
financial crisis, which included explicit and often enhanced government guarantees over and 
above the regular deposit insurance coverage. 
Chapter 3 fills the gap that theoretically explains and empirically identifies the fundamental 
factors that drive the physical location of bank branches. The contribution of the chapter is 
to develop a simple and intuitive framework in which banks rationally trade off the market-
size and price-cutting effects of geographical bank clustering. We then empirically test the 
model predictions in an international context, using the introduction of information sharing 
as country-level exogenous shocks that move banks towards a new clustering equilibrium. 
Second, this chapter uncovers an important mechanism on the economic impacts of 
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information sharing: the central availability of borrower information leads to different 
equilibrium levels of branch clustering, which may be associated with a reduction in spatial 
credit rationing. 
Taken together, the results show that branch clustering is a function of the public availability 
of trustworthy borrower information. When such information is more broadly available, it 
allows banks to expand their branch networks to new geographical localities that they 
would previously have avoided. At the same time, it becomes more important for banks to 
cluster together as a higher local variety of banks makes it easier to attract distant 
customers. Together these effects mean that banking markets become more homogenous 
in terms of composition – as they are served by the same banks that now operate across the 
country – but less homogenous in terms of size. While the public availability of information 
sharing leads to further clustering of banks in well-served locations, other (smaller) locations 
may lose out as access to credit deteriorates further. Assessing the real-economics impacts 
of such spatial variation in access to credit due to information sharing is a promising avenue 
for further research. Therefore, information sharing can not only directly improve access to 
credit by reducing information asymmetry, but also lead to denser bank branch networks 
and expand credit indirectly through increased competition. 
Chapter 4 contributes to an important strand of determinants of access to credit in three 
dimensions. First, this research examines the impact of corruption on credit access at the 
firm level, where we try to address the endogeneity issue and define a causal relationship by 
utilizing both an instrumental variable approach and an exact matching strategy. Second, 
the results show that the detrimental impact of bribery on firms’ credit access is mainly 
driven by supply-side rather than by demand-side factors. In other words, the impact is 
predominately driven by banks being less willing to lend to the bribing firms. Thus local 
banking structures are vital in shaping the impact of corruption. Lastly, this chapter, for the 
first time, presents a bank lending channel for corruption to impede economic growth, 
which is important to deepen our understanding of the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. 
This chapter is relevant from a policy perspective, as corruption has been a major challenge 
in transition countries and lots of countries are making intensive efforts to combat this issue. 
The findings indicate that banks generally punish bribing firms by tightening their credit 
access. This punishment could act as a self-correcting mechanism that a sound banking 
system can be deterrence for corruption. Therefore, this chapter highlights the importance 
of cooperation among regulatory authorities to combat corruption. The banking market 
regulations, for example, on foreign bank entry, or on inter-bank competition, might exert a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of corruption regulations. 
